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Power, Individualism, and Collective  
Self Perception in the USA 
Stephen Mennell ∗ 
Abstract: »Macht, Individualismus und die kollektive Selbstwahrnehmung in 
den USA«. The thesis of this paper is that the key element in the shaping of the 
habitus of Americans has been their very long-term, virtually unbroken, experi-
ence of their country becoming more and more powerful vis-à-vis its neigh-
bours. An increasing sense of their own powerfulness is related to the “indivi-
dualism” that has so often been discussed as a key characteristic of the 
American “national character.” The long-term process of habitus formation has 
had important consequences for the role of the USA in world affairs since the 
Second World War, and may continue to do so in a future marked for the first 
time by a long-term decline in American power.
Keywords: USA, habitus, identity, we-feelings, individualism, established-
outsider relations.
1. Introduction: Habitus and National Identity 
“Habitus,” in Norbert Elias’s simple definition, is “second nature”:
1
 everything 
that we have learned since birth through experience in contact with other hu-
man beings, but which has become so deeply ingrained that it feels even to 
ourselves to be something “innate” or “natural.” The concept is now widely 
                                                             
∗  Stephen Mennell, School of Sociology, University College Dublin, Belfield, Dublin D04 F6X4, 
Ireland; stephen.mennell@ucd.ie. I should like to thank Helmut Kuzmics for his invaluable 
comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 
1  It is often mistakenly believed that the concept of “habitus” was invented by Pierre Bour-
dieu. On the contrary, it has a long history, and can be traced back at least to Hugo Grotius 
in the 16th century (Goudsblom, 2002), or even to Thomas Aquinas, who drew upon Aristo-
tle to distinguish between dispositio, an invisible inner force, and habitus as something visi-
ble from outside. “Habitus” was widely used by French and German social scientists in the 
inter-war years, including by Norbert Elias in the original 1939 edition of Über den Prozess 
der Zivilisation. What is true is that the term had almost disappeared from English since 
about the 17th century – though the Oxford English Dictionary included it with the mean-
ing “an acquired tendency that has become instinctive”, almost exactly Elias’s sense, though 
he would have rejected the word “instinctive” – and for that reason in his English-language 
writings Elias and his translators at first used terms like “personality make-up.” After the 
word was re-introduced into English by Bourdieu’s translators in the 1980s, Elias began to 
use in English the word that he had always used in German. Bourdieu characteristically pro-
vided a far more complicated and abstract definition than Elias’s. 
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recognised as indispensable in bridging the supposed macro-micro divide.
2
 
Because habitus is acquired in groups, it comprises traits that are shared in 
groups. Such traits may range from, for example, ways of talking or walking 
that individuals learn from parents in the microcosm of the family, to attitudes 
and behaviour that are seen as marks arising from the experience of member-
ship of a whole nation state with its particular history. For obvious reasons, 
there is often unease about the notion of “national character” – which admitted-
ly has to be handled with great care (Mennell, 2015a). It tends to provoke ob-
jections that “all human beings are alike” or that “every individual is differ-
ent.”
3
 To clarify this issue, I have often quoted a remark made long ago by the 
anthropologist Clyde Kluckhohn and the psychologist Henry Murray (1948, 
35). 
Every man is in certain respects 
a)  like all other men 
b)  like some other men 
c)  like no other man
4
 
The domain of habitus is at level (b). In a lecture he gave in 1962, Norbert 
Elias made the point clearly: he spoke of differences between countries that are 
precipitated in the language and modes of thought of nations. They manifest 
themselves in the way in which people are attuned to one another in social in-
tercourse, and in how they react to personal or impersonal events. In every 
country the forms of perception and behaviour, in their full breadth and depth, 
have a pronounced national tinge. Often one only becomes aware of this in 
one’s dealings with foreigners. In interactions with one’s compatriots, individ-
ual differences usually impinge so strongly on consciousness that the common 
national coloration, what distinguishes them from individuals of other nations, 
is often overlooked. First of all, one often expects that people everywhere will 
react to the same situations in the same way as people of one’s own nation. 
When one finds oneself in a situation in which one is compelled to observe 
that members of different nations often react in a quite different way to what 
one is accustomed to at home, one mentally attributes this to their “national 
character.” (Elias 2008a, 230-1) 
                                                             
2  The absence of any such concept of habitus, or indeed of any social psychological compo-
nent, is a structural weakness in the work of many contemporary “theorists,” notably Marx-
ists such as Zygmunt Bauman (Kilminster 2017, 2019) and Weberians such as Michael Mann. 
3  In a long review article about by book, The American Civilizing Process (Mennell 2007), my 
old friend, Randall Collins (2009) was very uncomfortable with any discussion of the peculi-
arities of American “national character.” Collins began essentially from the crude argument 
that there is no such thing because all American individuals are different from each other. 
His deeper theoretical argument – equally misguided in my view – is the conventional sym-
bolic interactionist view that behaviour and feelings are always situationally “constructed” 
in the here and now. 
4  Seven decades ago, before consciousness of the need for gender-neutral vocabulary, “man” 
and “men” were of course habitually used to mean “person” and “people.” 
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But why should history at the level of the nation state be so particularly im-
portant in the formation of habitus at the level of individual citizens? Because 
of its rootedness in group identity, habitus is never devoid of an emotional 
charge; it is linked to people’s “we-feelings,” their feelings of belonging to 
groups of other people. Now, it is possible that in the earliest stages of human 
social development, when people thought about “us,” they were always refer-
ring to their own small hunter-gatherer band. But today people belong to many 
groups at every level; I have spoken of “the filo pastry of identity” (Mennell 
1994). My suggestion is that, beyond their immediate family, people are likely 
to feel the strongest emotional attachment to their “survival group.” What Elias 
meant by that term
5
 was the collectivity to which people mainly look for their 
basic needs: of protection, food, shelter, reproduction. Every human being is 
born into a survival unit, and as Kaspersen and Gabriel (2008) point out, this 
“is a relational concept which cannot be conceived outside a relationship with 
other survival units”. Over thousands of years of the development of human 
society, the very long-term trend has been towards survival groups on a larger 
and larger scale (Elias 2008b). That has gone along with the widening of circles 
of mutual identification (De Swaan 1995) to include ever larger numbers of 
other people. Factually, it may be argued that we live in a single planet-wide 
survival group – we are all dependent for our survival on everyone else. As 
Elias put it, “all possible actors are already on stage” (Elias 2007, 154). But, 
precisely because there is no other group from outside threatening humanity as 
a whole – we have not seen a realisation of H. G. Wells’ War of the Worlds – it 
would probably be fair to say that few people on the planet experience it as 
their most powerful emotional identification. No, in the modern world, the 
largest survival group with which most people have a sense of belonging and 
with which they emotionally identify strongly has typically – in recent centu-
ries – been a nation state.
6
 But this is not inevitable; and it is not fixed. Feelings 
for one’s nation do not obliterate loyalties to groups at lower levels. Indeed, 
those remain important in times of stress: the emotional centre of gravity, so to 
speak, may slide up or down through the filo of identity. In particular, this 
process is associated with rises and falls in the level of dangers experienced in 
people’s everyday lives. Or, more exactly, one should speak of rises and falls in 
levels of fear, because it seems that the effect is brought about by perceived 
danger, whether real or imaginary. There appears to be an asymmetry involved. 
The broadening of identity appears normally to be a slow process, marked by 
                                                             
5  At first, Elias used the term “attack-and-defence units” (see Elias 2012a), but later settled on 
the broader term “survival unit.” 
6  Eugen Weber’s great study (1977) of the transformation of “peasants into Frenchmen” 
demonstrates how relatively weak was a sense of national identity in the remoter areas of 
provincial France even in the 19th century. It is a useful reminder of similar processes in 
other countries such as Germany, Italy, and the USA. 
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considerable “cultural lag.”
7
 For example, although in its origins the European 
Union was precisely an attempt to reduce the danger and the fear of there ever 
again being wars among the states of Europe by binding them together into a 
wider web of interdependence, only a small minority of European people feel 
the emotional commitment to the EU that they feel to their country (the point 
was dramatically demonstrated by the outcome of the Brexit referendum in 
2016, when a narrow majority of British people – including a disproportionate 
number of older and less well educated people – voted for the UK to leave the 
EU.) In contrast, an abrupt rise in fears and dangers may lead quite rapidly to a 
narrower sense of identity, as could be seen in the breakup of Yugoslavia in the 
1990s.
8
 In that case, people often faced factually increased dangers from neigh-
bours with whom they had lived in peace for many years before. The main 
point of my argument here is that the circle of mutual identification can con-
tract as well as increase in scope, and that in the USA, habitus and identity 
have been marked both by overall national pride and by intense localism – a 
sort of bimodalism has emerged. Of course there are millions of Americans 
who share few if any of the characteristics I am about to discuss, but there are 
more millions who do. 
2.  The Formation of the American State and Empire 
The process of Americans becoming ever more powerful in relation to their 
neighbours began almost immediately after the first European settlements in 
North America in the early 16th century. After Independence, for many Ameri-
cans, loyalty to one’s state of origin at first outweighed sense of allegiance to 
the Union. It is often recalled that as late as the start of the Civil War, Robert E. 
Lee was offered command of the Union armies, but considered he owed prima-
ry loyalty to his own state of Virginia. However, from Independence onwards, 
the number of states created by the Union came to outnumber the 13 who had 
created the Union, and the Union gradually became the main focus of patriot-
ism. True, in the South, some identification with the Confederacy has lingered, 
but the Civil War settled the question of whether states had the right to secede. 
On the whole, most Americans take pride in their country’s dominance in the 
                                                             
7  The term “cultural lag” was introduced by the great American sociologist W. F. Ogburn 
(1923); much later, to convey much the same idea, Pierre Bourdieu introduced the term 
“hysteresis,” borrowed from the natural sciences, where it refers to the state of a system 
being dependent on its history. This is a fine example of sociologists’ endless tendency con-
ceptually to re-invent the wheel. 
8  The essay in which I first used the expression “filo pastry of identity” (1994) was written at 
the time of the civil war in which Yugoslavia broke up into (at least) six smaller survival 
units: the new states of Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, and what is now to be called 
North Macedonia as well as Bosnia, which itself is a fragile unit. 
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world, even though for many that goes along with resentment at the internal 
power of “Washington.” 
Growing power becomes associated with a sense of one’s country pos-
sessing a special virtue; in the case of other imperial powers, most notably the 
British in the 19th century, this can take the form of a “civilising mission,” or 
“the white man’s burden” (in spite of said white men being a burden to others). 
At first glance, this intense pride in their power over others may seem to be at 
odds with the popular perception of the social character of Americans, whose 
manners have been seen to reflect the supposedly egalitarian character of 
American society. But a connection needs to be made between the development 
of internal power relations and external power relations with the peoples of 
neighbouring societies. The link between the two becomes clearer in the light 
of Elias’s model of established-outsider relations.  
By way of explanation: around 1959–60, Norbert Elias and his MA student 
John Scotson conducted a study (2008) of a small industrial settlement on the 
periphery of Leicester. Briefly, it contained two working-class groups (white 
working-class, one should perhaps say now – it was before the advent in 
Leicester of large numbers of South Asian migrants). The two groups worked 
in the same factories, and, by ordinary sociological classifications based on 
their occupations, they were indistinguishable. The main difference, however, 
was that one group lived in the “Village,” an area of housing dating from the 
1880s, where many of the families were old-established and had intermarried 
over the generations, weaving dense social networks. Being long established in 
the neighbourhood, they had also come to occupy all the main centres of local 
power – in the churches, charities, clubs, pubs, and so on. The other group, 
living in the “Estate,” built on the eve of the Second World War, were relative 
newcomers, many of them relocated with their employers from London during 
the war. The essential point is that the “established” Villagers contrived to 
despise the extremely similar “outsiders” in the Estate. One of Elias’s most 
interesting insights was into the role played by gossip. The Villagers gossiped 
among each other about themselves, in terms of a “minority of the best.” That 
is, they constructed a we-image – a kind of group self-stereotype – based on a 
selection of the most upright and worthy members of their own group. That 
was “praise gossip.” It provided the basis for strong we-feelings and a collec-
tive sense of virtue. But there was “blame gossip” as well. They gossiped about 
the people of the Estate, in terms of a “minority of the worst,” constructing 
another stereotype, a “they-image” of the Estate based on the behaviour of just 
two or three families who were violent and drunk and promiscuous, and whose 
children were in danger of becoming “juvenile delinquents.” Most people in the 
Estate were not like that. But they could not retaliate with a wave of counter-
gossip because their social networks and their positions of power were not as 
well developed as those exploited by the “Villagers.” Still more significantly, 
Elias and Scotson found that the people of the Estate had tended to some extent 
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to absorb the Villagers’ adverse image of them into their own we-image – they 
had begun to think of themselves as to some extent “not as good as” the Villag-
ers. But that did not obliterate a persisting resentment too. Outsider groups – 
the less powerful parties to a power ratio – are generally marked by ambiva-
lence, by fluctuations between acceptance of and resentment at their position of 
inferiority. And, in general, when the power ratio between an established and 
an outsider group comes to be more evenly balanced, the resentment will come 
more to the fore. I should like to suggest that the relationship between America 




There is a tendency – especially among Americans – to think about the 
United States as if it were an emanation of the human spirit, as if its existence 
and its constitutional arrangements were a bloodless product of the Enlighten-
ment, John Locke, the genius of the Founding Fathers, and the pure democratic 
spirit of “No taxation without representation!” In fact, the formation of the 
territorial unit that we now know as the USA was a bloody business, not at all 
dissimilar to the formation of states in Western Europe. If we look back a thou-
sand years, Western Europe was fragmented into numerous tiny territories, 
each ruled – that is, protected and exploited – by some local warlord. Out of 
the patchwork, over a period of many centuries there gradually emerged a 
smaller number of larger territories. This was a violent “elimination contest” 
(Elias 2012b, 304-10). It is a mistake to see the process as driven by “aggres-
sion,” as if the personality traits of individual warriors were the determining 
force. That would be to fall into the same trap of a one-sided cultural explana-
tion as the “pure Enlightenment” account of the USA’s origins. In an age when 
the control of land was the principal basis of power, a peace-loving local mag-
nate could not sit idly by while his neighbours slugged it out: the winner, who 
gained control over a larger territory, would then be able to gobble up the little 
peace-loving neighbour. War and “aggression” thus had a survival value. The 
process was Janus-faced: as larger territories became internally pacified, the 
wars between territories came to be fought on a steadily larger scale. 
In fact Elias hit the nail on the head when he drew a humorous comparison 
between medieval Europe and westward expansion in 19th-century USA: “To 
some extent the same is true of the French kings and their representatives as 
was once said of the American pioneer: ‘He didn’t want all the land; he just 
wanted the land next to his’” (Elias 2012b, 346). One difference between the 
two continents is that the struggle for territory after the beginnings of European 
settlement was initially driven exogenously by conflicts between the great 
powers back in Europe, as much as by rivalries endogenous to North America. 
In the early stages, the process somewhat resembled the competition for territo-
                                                             
9  I have illustrated this argument by taking a tough case: Western perceptions of the annexa-
tion of the Crimea by Russia in 2014; see Mennell (2015b). 
HSR 45 (2020) 1  │  315 
ry in 19th-century Africa. Apart from early skirmishes with the Indians in the 
eastern seaboard states, most of the early wars there were branches of contem-
poraneous wars in Europe, including the Anglo-Dutch wars, the War of the 
Spanish Succession, and the Seven Years War. Through these contests, first the 
Swedish colonies and then the Dutch were eliminated, and later French and 
Spanish power was broken. The various Indian tribes were also involved in 
these struggles as allies of the European powers, and were simultaneously 
engaged in elimination contests amongst themselves. Gradually, however, the 
struggles came to be shaped much more by endogenous forces, and especially 
by the logic of “wanting the land next to his.” 
This is not the place to retell the story of how American Independence came 
about, except to say that the taxation to which the settlers did not wish to con-
tribute without representation arose from the costs of military control over a 
much larger territory after the effective elimination of French power from 
Canada and the trans-Appalachian region. But there is another side to the story 
besides this familiar one. The British had intended to reserve the Ohio Valley 
for their Iroquois allies, but settlers were already pressing westwards. As has 
been recognised at least since Theodore Roosevelt wrote The Winning of the 
West (1889-99), the War of Independence was also a war over the control of 
conquests. The colonials were also colonisers. 
Westward expansion at the expense of the Native Americans (Stannard 
1992) was driven by the pressure of land-hungry migrants pushing forward in 
advance of effective federal government control of the territory, in contrast 
with policies followed in the settlement of Canada and Siberia. The scenes with 
which we are familiar from the Western movies are a glamorised version of a 
process of conquest and internal pacification, which played an important part in 
the formation of modern American habitus.
10
 
In the decades after the Civil War, the USA increased rapidly in population 
and industrial power. The West was populated, to the extent that in 1891 the 
frontier was deemed to have been “closed.” But it is important to grasp the 
continuity between the final stages of westward expansion and the early stages 
                                                             
10  Americans sometimes point out that they bought much of their territory rather than con-
quering it by force of arms. That is certainly true of the Louisiana Purchase, which in 1803 
doubled the federal territory. It arose, however, out of a particularly favourable conjunction 
in European power politics, when it suited Napoleon to be rid of extraneous responsibilities. 
It is also true that another huge acquisition of land took place when the United States paid 
Mexico for a vast swathe of territory. But that was only after it had impressed upon Mexico 
that this was an offer it could not refuse, by invading that unfortunate country and sacking 
its capital city. “Poor Mexico! So far from God and so close to the United States”, as Presi-
dent Porfírio Diáz later remarked. Ulysses S. Grant, who served as a young officer in the 
Mexican War, regarded the war as “one of the most unjust ever waged by a stronger against 
a weaker nation. It was an instance of a republic following the bad example of European 
monarchies, in not considering justice in their desire to acquire additional territory” (Grant, 
1994 [1885], 37). 
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of the acquisition of its first overseas empire – including the Philippines, Ha-
waii, Puerto Rico, and, for a time, Cuba (Zimmerman 2002; Hopkins 2018) – 
through the Spanish-American War of 1898. In other words, the elimination 
contest that began before Independence was in effect continued in the world 
beyond America’s boarders. Yet, until after the Second World War, it would 
not be fair to see the USA as the militaristic state that it has since become. 
Historically, the USA always had what was in international terms a low “mili-
tary participation ratio” (Andreski 1968) – in other words, it normally had a 
very small army in relation to its population (Mennell 2007, 240-4). After each 
war – in the War of 1812, the Mexican War, the Civil War, the war with Spain, 
the First World War – its military establishment fell back to very low peace-
time levels. But, for the first time, that did not happen after the Second World 
War. By 1961, in his famous farewell address to the nation, President Eisen-
hower (1961) warned his fellow Americans against what he christened “the 
military-industrial complex.” His warning was not heeded. In effect, America 
has, ever since the Second World War, fought a series of “splendid little 
wars”
11
 that have had the latent function of keeping its economy prospering and 
feeding the congressional pork-barrel process. They include the many proxy 
wars in which the Cold War with the USSR was acted out – notably the disas-
ter of Vietnam – through the hubris of the 1990s and further disasters of the 
early 2000s in Afghanistan, Iraq and the greater Middle East. By the early 21st 
century, the USA was clearly an imperial power – albeit an “incoherent” one 
(Mann 2004) – even if its regional governors did not wear cocked hats. The 
2002 National Security Strategy of the United States declared that the USA had 
the right to intervene against its opponents anywhere in the globe, and came 
very close to claiming for the American government a monopoly of the legiti-
mate use of force throughout the world.
12
 In other words, in terms of Max 
Weber’s definition of a state (1978, i, 54), the USA has come close to declaring 
itself a world state. In some ways, indeed, the USA does now act as a world 
government (Mandelbaum 2006). Its military expenditure is as large as that of 
all the other countries in the world combined. It has in effect garrisoned the 
planet, dividing the entire globe into US military commands. It currently has 
military bases in about 80 of the countries of the world (Slater 2018), including 
                                                             
11  The phrase “splendid little war” was used by John Hay (subsequently US Secretary of State) 
to describe the Spanish–American War of 1898. In a letter to his friend Theodore Roosevelt, 
he wrote, “It has been a splendid little war; begun with the highest motives, carried on with 
magnificent intelligence and spirit, favoured by the fortune which loves the brave. It is now 
to be concluded, I hope, with that firm good nature which is after all the distinguishing 
trait of our American character.” (Quoted from Thomas 1971, 404). 
12  Helmut Kuzmics (personal communication) contrasts the gung-ho American military adven-
turism of recent decades with the “hesitancy” that marked the Habsburg empire in its de-
clining phase. 
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some in the territory of the former Soviet Union.
13
 American dominance, 
though, does not by any means rest on military power alone, but also, and 
especially, on its economic power. The establishment of the US dollar as the 
world’s principal currency has enabled the USA to claim extra-territorial juris-
diction for its own laws in many fields,
14
 while itself refusing to be bound by 
the corpus of international law that most other countries accept.  
Overall, since the Second World War, the USA has turned into a “warfare 
state,” a thoroughly militaristic society, something that is much more visible 
from outside than from within the USA. William Astore (2018) has compared 
“Blitzkrieg overseas” with “Sitzkrieg in the homeland.” In accordance with the 
principle that in very unequal power ratios, the more powerful side knows, 
perceives, and understands much less about the weaker party than the weaker 
does about the stronger,
15
 surveys have repeatedly shown how ignorant a large 
part of the American population is about the rest of the world, and how rela-
tively few of them ever travel beyond the frontiers of the USA.
16
 Yet stereo-
types of the outside world play an important role in American we-images. As 
Gore Vidal mordantly observed, there is always “a horrendous foreign enemy 
at hand to blow us up in the night out of hatred of our Goodness and rosy 
plumpness” (2004, 6); this helps to stoke up internal fear about external threats. 
This ignorance (Alexander, 2011) is not confined to the American lumpenpro-
letariat: it has also guided members of the elite in the idiocies of American 
foreign policy. 
On the other side of the power ratio, it often seems that America sets cultur-
al models and standards for the rest of the world, which laps up American 
media and popular culture uncritically. Certainly, American popular culture 
feeds into Americans’ own “praise gossip” amongst themselves, and it is also 
true that it forms part of the rest of the world’s “they-images” of the USA. It is 
                                                             
13  Including all types of bases, for example intelligence-gathering ones as well as military, the 
figure is probably much higher. Chalmers Johnson (2004) claimed it had bases in 130 out of 
194 countries. 
14  Any financial transaction that “pings” for even a nanosecond through a computer in New 
York is deemed subject to US law, thus permitting the US government to take punitive ac-
tion against a great range of non-American corporations which, for example, trade with 
one of the many countries in the world on which the US has imposed economic sanctions. 
The dominance of American economic policy has been further reinforced through organisa-
tions including the IMF, World Bank, and credit-rating agencies. 
15  The principle was probably first described by Hegel (1977, 111) in his discussion of the 
master–slave relationship, but has been confirmed in many empirical sociological studies 
since then; see Mennell, 2007, 311-4. 
16  A vivid illustration of this is the American journalist Suzy Hansen’s account (2017) of her 
move to Turkey, which she not only experienced as culturally very different from the USA 
but also found helped her through obstacles to coming to terms with her own country’s 
violent role in the world. 
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often seen in Washington as a major resource of “soft power.”
17
 But that should 
not be exaggerated. There is also a long list of things that outsiders do not like 
about America, which also feed into their “blame gossip,” their they-images of 
the USA. These features include aspects both internal to American society and 
external to it. Among internal faults may be listed: a corrupt electoral system 
(including gerrymandering of boundaries, and the systematic disqualification of 
millions of citizens); racism, seen especially in exceptionally high rates of 
incarceration; a highly politicised judiciary; the retention of the death penalty 
in a good many states, now considered unacceptable in most Western countries; 
and the extreme domination of the US government by big business and big 
finance. Among the disliked aspects that impinge mainly outside the USA 
itself, one may briefly mention: the USA’s bloated military machine; its con-
tinuous record of military intervention in countries in many parts of the world; 
its programme of kidnappings and targeted assassinations of people deemed to 
be its enemies; its routine use of torture and its use of long-term imprisonment 
without trial at Guantanamo Bay; its support for corrupt authoritarian regimes 
in the Middle East and elsewhere; and its interventions in the politics of count-
less other countries (which make the furore about Russian intervention in the 
2016 Presidential election especially piquant). To the extent that these features 
help to form negative “they-images” of the USA on the part of many people 
elsewhere in the world, and to the extent that Americans become aware of 
those hostile feelings, they give fears of “hatred of our Goodness and rosy 
plumpness” a self-fulfilling quality. 
How does this “macro-level” picture enter into the “micro-level” processes 
of habitus-formation in individuals? A good illustration is the changing balance 
of power between USA and Britain over more than two centuries. Until late in 
the 19th century, Britain was a far more powerful force in world affairs than 
the USA; it had much larger armed forces, and until the 1850s even had a larg-
er population. Through a study of the perceptions of British visitors to the USA 
from the 18th century onwards, Allan Nevins (1948) demonstrated that, as the 
balance of power between Britain and the USA gradually swung in the latter’s 
favour, the British – who had started by rather looking down on Americans – 
came very much to look up to them and admire them. That is true, but Nevins 
rather missed the ambivalence in British attitudes, which were and are pep-
pered with resentment as well as a sense of enduring cultural superiority. 
Symptoms of resentment are not hard to find. For example, as early as 1930, 
the American economist and journalist Ludwell Denny wrote a book entitled 
                                                             
17  The historian Alfred McCoy (2018) has argued that China’s prospects of attaining global 
hegemony are somewhat impeded by its relative lack of such resources of “soft power,” but 
that President Trump is rapidly destroying America’s advantage in this respect. 
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America Conquers Britain: A Record of Economic War.
18
 After the Second 
World War, the two countries fought it out again for supremacy in the aviation 
industry (Engel 2007), America winning hands down. The role of the USA in 
the dismantling of the British Empire in the same period – no doubt a “good 
thing” in itself – is widely recognised. The most dramatic event was President 
Eisenhower’s scuttling of the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt in 1956. Be-
neath the embarrassing cringing by British governments for a “special relation-
ship” with the USA, it is not hard to find a level of resentment among ordinary 
British people. In the dynamics of established-outsider relationships, that may 
be of little consequence, since Britain is highly unlikely to be able to tip the 
scales of the power ratio back against the USA (especially after Brexit, when it 
cuts itself off from the world’s largest trading bloc). But that is not true of 
other, rising, powers, notably China. How will that affect American habitus? 
3.  American Individualism 
“Individualism” has long been seen as one of the chief characteristic of Ameri-
can habitus. The term seems first to have been used by Alexis de Tocqueville 
in his classic Democracy in America. America, he said, was one country in the 
world where the precepts of Descartes were least studied yet most followed. In 
their common assumptions Americans sought “to evade the bondage of system 
and habit, of family maxims, class opinions, and, in some degree, of national 
prejudices; to accept tradition only as a means of information, and […] to seek 
the reason of things for oneself, and in oneself alone.” In short, “each American 
appeals to the individual exercise of his own understanding alone” (1961 
[1835-40], ii, 1-2). 
Tocqueville here elegantly captures an American proneness to what Norbert 
Elias (2012b, 512-9, 522-6) later called the homo clausus conception of human 
beings – a mode of self-experience as a “closed person,” as a single isolated 
individual separate from other individuals. But this characteristic is not the 
product of free-floating “ideas.” The rootedness of “individualism” in practical 
experience was described by Frederick Jackson Turner in his celebrated 1893 
paper, “The significance of the frontier in American history” (1947 [1920]). 
Most famous were Turner’s remarks about “rugged individualism.” 
[T]he frontier is productive of individualism. Complex society is precipitated 
by the wilderness into a kind of primitive organization based on the family. 
The tendency is anti-social. It produces antipathy to control. The tax-gatherer 
is viewed as a representative of oppression. (1947 [1920], 30) 
                                                             
18  The title page of my copy says “Economic War,” while the cover of the book reads “Econom-
ic Strife.” 
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Even after more than a century of debate among historians, it is generally 
agreed that there is a kernel of truth in “the Turner thesis.”
19
 It appears to me, 
however, that the roots of this aspect of American habitus, this mode of self-
experience, do not lie exclusively on the frontier. Images of cowboys and farm-
ers in the West tend to focus on their plucky self-reliance in the face of dan-
gers, notably from the prairie “Indians,” but at least as important must have 
been their experience of their own ultimately invincible power over those they 
displaced. The experience of being on the favourable end of a power ratio was 
scarcely confined to the frontier, however. At least as important in the mix that 
became American habitus was the slave-owning South. In the 1830s, at just the 
same time as Tocqueville, Harriet Martineau brilliantly captured the difference 
in habitus between northern and southern congressman:  
It is in Washington that varieties of manners are conspicuous. There the 
Southerners appear at most advantage, and the New Englanders to the least; 
the ease and frank courtesy of the gentry of the South (with an occasional 
touch of arrogance, however), contrasting with the cautious, somewhat 
gauche, and too deferential air of the members from the North. One fancies 
one can tell a New England member in the open air by his deprecatory walk. 
He seems to bear in mind perpetually that he cannot fight a duel, while other 
people can. (1838, i, 145) 
One senses that, for all that she appears to have admired the polish of the 
southerners, the word “bullies,” or something like it, was lurking in Marti-
neau’s subconscious. The Southern swagger at which Martineau hints may 
have first been associated with the minority of planters who owned large num-
bers of slaves, but the sense of superiority and power over African-Americans 
certainly spread to “poor whites” in the Reconstruction and Jim Crow periods, 
and it has not entirely disappeared today. I would argue that a similar process 
of “trickling down” of feelings of superiority, power and entitlement has arisen 
– for Americans in general – from identification with the growth of the USA as 
an economic, political and military power, and also through the abundant op-
portunities which were presented for many Americans to “better themselves.” 
In short, it is linked to the “American Dream,” which today has become largely 
mythical. 
The writer Hari Kunzru (2015) remarked that “Americans are culturally 
averse to any explanation not based on the feelings and doings of the sovereign 
individual.” It is tempting to say that when Americans boast of their “indivi-
dualism” and “the freedom of the individual” they mean what the rest of us call 
“selfishness.”
20
 That would, however, be unfair: between “selfishness” and 
“altruism” there is never a simple dichotomous choice. It is better seen as a 
                                                             
19  For a summary of the long controversies among historians about the “Turner thesis,” see 
Mennell (2007, 193-7; or, more briefly, Mennell (2017). 
20  American authors occasionally make the same point: see for instance James L. Collier (1991). 
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continuum, a question of how large in scope is the “circle of mutual identifica-
tion,” how far-flung is the range of people with whom one can feel some emo-
tional tie and sympathy. Or it can even better be seen in terms of the “We-I 
balance” (Elias 2010, 137-208) in people’s habitus, or “habits of the heart.” It 
probably is true to say that the real effect of the practical Cartesianism to which 
Tocqueville pointed is to pose a barrier to the easy comprehension of how 
events at the national and international level are linked to the experience of 
individual people.  
What is perhaps most peculiar about the modal American We-I balance was 
obliquely summed up back in the 1960s by the historian David Potter, when he 
remarked that it had been the “curious fate” of the United States, to exert im-
mense influence in the modern world “without itself quite understanding the 
nature of this influence.” He observed that: 
In the twentieth century the United States developed what was perhaps the 
first mass society, but the American cult of equality and individualism pre-
vented Americans from analysing their mass society in realistic terms. Often 
they treated it as if it were simply an infinite aggregation of Main Streets in 
Zenith, Ohio. (Potter 1968, 136) 
That insight was magnificently illustrated much more recently in Arlie Russell 
Hochschild’s ethnographic exploration of Tea Party supporters in Louisiana 
(2016). She was at pains to stress that her respondents were not monsters: many 
or most were likeable and friendly people, showing normal human sympathy 
and consideration within their local communities, but with little understanding 
of the broader social forces that caused them hardship and suffering. Notable 
among those causes were the oil and chemical corporations associated with 
dreadful pollution. But they had also provided employment for many local 
inhabitants, whose resentments tended to be directed not at big business but at 
what they saw as big government,
21
 and at its spending for the benefit of other 
communities elsewhere, including blacks and other minorities.
22
 
Yet there is indeed a grain of truth in there being in America a cult of the 
“sovereign individual” that acts as an obstacle to any explanation not couched 
in terms of motives and psychology of individuals; it has many practical conse-
                                                             
21  Again, there is an historical background. Data from the Pew Research Centre show that 
trust in US government was notably high in the post-war years, but underwent a steep de-
cline at the time of the Vietnam War, from which it never recovered: see 
<http://www.people-press.org/2017/12/14/public-trust-in-government-1958-2017/>. Vi-
etnam provoked massive resistance within the USA because of the draft; subsequent mili-
tary disasters have had less domestic effect because the draft was abolished. 
22  Nathan Glazer (2005, and elsewhere) has argued that the relative weakness of social wel-
fare, including health care, provision in the USA is linked to voters’ reluctance to pay higher 
taxes for the benefit of what they perceive to be “undeserving” welfare recipients, especially 
racial groups disproportionately found among the poor: African Americans and Hispanics. 
This is a symptom the boundaries of such voters’ “circle of mutual identification.” 
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quences. Most obvious is the “gun culture,” which kills many thousands of 
Americans every year. (More people have been killed in firearm-related inci-
dents within the USA in last 50 years than have died in all the wars in US his-
tory – about 1.5 million compared with 1.2 million. See Adam Hochschild 
2018; Henigan 2016.) How often does one hear the specious argument that 
“Guns don’t kill people, people kill people”? This idea is associated with think-
ing in purely interactionist terms, about “how do I protect myself if the other 
person has a gun and I don’t?” The notion that it would be very different if gun 
ownership were uncommon and very strictly regulated is a foreign one. Most 
countries – since at least the “sword hunts” of early Tokugawa Japan – have 
sought to limit the right of citizens to own weapons for their own use in attack 
and defence. Not so in the USA. The most convincing long-term explanation is 
that offered by Pieter Spierenburg (2006), that “democracy came too early” to 
America. He argues that, for example in what became France and in most other 
parts of Western Europe, there had taken place over many centuries gradual 
processes of centralisation, eventuating in the concentration of the means of 
violence in fewer and fewer hands, and ultimately in the establishment of a 
relatively effective monopoly apparatus in the hands of kings. Gradual it may 
have been, but the struggles among a warrior elite were bloody, as more and 
more players were deprived of their capacity to wage war independently of the 
central ruler. The process was in its final stages when European colonisation of 
North America began. Once stable and effective royal monopolies of violence 
had been established, as they were in general by the late 17th and the 18th 
centuries, the people’s aim in subsequent struggles – most spectacularly in the 
French Revolution – was not to challenge or destroy the monopoly as such, but 
rather to “co-possess” the monopoly (as Spierenburg terms it). In other words, 
the aim was to assert a more broadly based control over those who exercised 
the monopoly, to democratise it. Conditions were very different in North 
America: “there was no phase of centralization before democratization set in,” 
and  
[T]he inhabitants did not have sufficient time to become accustomed to being 
disarmed. As a consequence, the idea remained alive that the very existence of 
a monopoly of force was undesirable. And it remained alive in an increasingly 
democratic form: not [as in medieval Europe] of regional elites carving out 
their private principality, but of common people claiming the right of self-
defence. [...] Local elites and, increasingly, common people equated democra-
cy with the right of armed protection of their own property and interests. 
(2006, 109-10) 
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On the frontier, especially, the forces of the state were often too distant to be 
called upon,
23
 so settlers had no alternative but to use their own arms to protect 
themselves from danger; and as noted above, the myth of the frontier has en-
dured as a cultural influence into an age when most Americans live in cities. 
Spierenburg acknowledges that it would be an oversimplification to suggest 
that the transition from struggles to destroy the monopoly apparatus to strug-
gles to co-possess it did not take place at all in the USA, but “the best one can 
say is that the majority of the population wanted it both ways”: they “accepted 
the reality of government institutions but at the same time they cherished an 
ethic of self-help” (2006, 110). 
In any case, the ideal of tight regulation of gun ownership is now practically 
unattainable. The Second Amendment, in the Bill of Rights, guarantees that “A 
well-regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right 
of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.”
24
 A well-regulated 
militia means a force under public control, but the highly politicised Supreme 
Court, in District of Columbia v. Heller (2008), chose to interpret the amend-
ment as protecting individual rather than collective rights. Most non-Americans 
(like many Americans) regard this as preposterous. 
Another instance of what might be called the “micro-level default setting” in 
American habitus – one which has had as widespread effects across the world 
as has American militarism – is the near-universal deference paid to free-
market, micro-economic economic doctrines. Although this was no doubt al-
ready a strong current in American popular attitudes, it found its purest intel-
lectual expression in the so-called “Friedman Doctrine.” Milton Friedman 
(1963) argued that a corporation need concern itself with only one goal: mak-
ing profits for its shareholders. It should not take into consideration any re-
sponsibility to society more broadly – to the welfare of its employees, custom-
ers or the communities in which it was located (unless of course such 
considerations promoted profits); it was up to shareholders in their private 
capacity to exercise social responsibility (good luck with that!). Were compa-
nies to consider their social responsibilities, that would lead to totalitarianism – 
an extension of the argument advanced by Friedrich Hayek in his book The 
Road to Serfdom (1944). Although it is usually dangerous to exaggerate the 
influence of academic work on popular thinking, Friedman’s ideas undoubtedly 
strongly influenced the policies of governments (not just in America) and the 
behaviour of corporations.
25
 This Manichaean pattern of thought may also have 
                                                             
23  That was true for only limited spans of time in any one location: as the frontier moved 
westwards, the forces of the federal and then state governments back-filled the void quite 
quickly. See Mennell (2007), chapter 8. 
24  For a full study of the Second Amendment, see Uviller and Merkel (2002). 
25  There was always a dissident minority of economists, even in America – for example Heil-
broner (1976). Among many recent critiques of the consequences of Milton Friedman and 
the Chicago School of economics, see notably Naomi Klein (2007). 
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had popular appeal in the USA, reinforcing a tendency to think in black and 
white, and filtering down to affect the general principles of how individuals 
feel able to live their everyday lives – perhaps caring for the people they know 
face-to-face, but with few other duties apart from one of broad national loyalty 
to the USA. When Americans express their pride in “individualism,” they 
fundamentally mean the pursuit of self-interest with no concern for the public 
good, which, by means of magical-mythical thinking, they assume can be left 
to take care of itself. The effect of that belief is to reduce pressure in an increas-
ingly complex society to exercise more and more complicated foresight – con-
trary to Norbert Elias’s expectation (2012b, 418-22) that the pressure would 
increase as a result of people becoming enmeshed in longer chains of interde-
pendence in the course of social development.  
Underlying this is a curious blindness to power relationships.
26
 Free-market 
economists generally make the mistaken assumption that the existence of a 
“market-clearing price” means that the power of buyers and sellers is equal – it 
must be, because they have reached agreement. Nor is this confined to econom-
ics. It has also been largely true of American sociologists – at least since C. 
Wright Mills (1956), who certainly did understand power; in general, they 
remain stuck at the level of “interaction” rather than “interdependence,” with 
the so-called “macro-micro problem” still viewed (erroneously) as an un-
bridgeable gulf. They may know that modern individuals belong to long chains 
and dense webs of interdependence with millions of people across the globe 
whom they never meet face-to-face, with more or less unequal power ratios 
involved at every link in the chain and node in the web, but they do not ade-
quately conceptualise how this “macro” fact relates to the “micro” experience 
of individuals. 
If all this sounds to be at too high an intellectual level, too abstract to relate 
to the everyday habitus of American citizens, consider what a large proportion 
of them can be counted upon to sing the praises of “freedom” in their “free 
country.” That is an over-abstract idea if ever there was one. For, as Norbert 
Elias pithily observed,  
when […] the “freedom”, of the individual is stressed, it is usually forgotten 
that there are always simultaneously many mutually dependent individuals, 
whose interdependence to a greater or lesser extent limits each one’s scope for 
action. (2012a, 162)  
And some are more free than others … 
                                                             
26  For a fuller discussion of this point, see Mennell (2014). 
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4.  Conclusion 
I have argued that American habitus has been formed during a very long-term, 
virtually unbroken, experience of the USA becoming more and more powerful 
vis-à-vis its neighbours. The USA’s overwhelming military, political, and 
economic power in the world today is a source of great national pride to most 
Americans, usually in a largely unreflective way. This abundance of power, so 
taken for granted, appears to distort American perceptions of themselves and 
others. In accordance with Elias’s model of established-outsider relations, 
Americans have tended to employ a sort of praise-gossip to construct a very 
favourable we-image, or collective self-image, a picture of their own virtue and 
superiority. It makes it especially difficult for them to understand why such a 
large proportion of the world’s population hates America and the wreckage it 
has made of the world order. 
Frederick Jackson Turner traced the individualism that is so often seen as a 
main characteristic of American national character, tending towards the “anti-
social” and an “antipathy to control,” to the experience of the minority of 
Americans who pushed the frontier westwards in the 18th and 19th centuries. I 
have argued its foundations are broader than that. The USA’s growing power 
and wealth, along with the immense opportunities it has offered to its citizens 
over more than two centuries, have given them a sense of their own power and 
superiority. 
This long-term trend may be about to change for the first time since the be-
ginnings of European settlement in North America. The military superiority of 
the USA will endure for at least several decades more, but its economic and 
political domination is no longer quite as unchallenged as it was in the 1990s 
and early 2000s. It is generally expected that China, in particular, will in a 
relatively short time surpass the USA in the size of its economy. The future 
may bring unaccustomed national humiliations. Indeed, the 9/11 attacks on 
New York and Washington in 2001 were, besides acts of mass murder, intend-
ed as such humiliations. In that light, it appears likely that the USA will be-
come an even more dangerous force in world affairs than it has been in the first 
decades of the 21st century. For, as Norbert Elias pointed out,  
the fortunes of a nation over the centuries become sedimented into the habitus 
of its individual members. Sociologists face a task here that distantly recalls 
the task that Freud tackled. He attempted to show the connection between the 
outcome of the conflict-ridden channeling of drives in a person’s development 
and his or her resulting habitus. But there are also analogous connections be-
tween a people’s long-term fortunes and experiences and their social habitus 
at any subsequent time. At this layer of the personality structure – let us for 
the time being call it the “we-layer” – there are often complex symptoms of 
disturbance at work which are scarcely less in strength and in capacity to 
cause suffering than the neuroses of an individual character. (Elias 2013, 24) 
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Moreover, in a remark that was prescient and piquant in light of Britain’s vote 
in the 2016 referendum to give up its membership of the European Union, Elias 
observed that “Britain in the recent past is a moving example of the difficulties 
a great power of the first rank has had in adjusting to its sinking to being a 
second- or third-class power” (2013, 6). There is no danger in the foreseeable 
future of the USA becoming a second- or third-class power, but all power is 
relative, and a relative decline vis-à-vis other powers may be experienced as 
humiliating by individual Americans. That is one significance of the success of 
Donald Trump’s slogan “Make America Great Again.” The danger is that, 
while his presidency may help the rest of the world to view America in a more 
realistic and less deferential way, it may also make it even more difficult for 
Americans, looking out, to see themselves as others see them. 
O, wad some Power the giftie gie us 
To see oursels as others see us! 
It wad frae monie a blunder free us 
– Robert Burns, To a Louse 
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